A cross-border media investigation reports that around €8 million worth of technology from Dutch companies ended up in a covert Russian defence program after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, despite sanctions. The findings center on “Harmony,” a state-run seabed surveillance network designed to detect submarines and other maritime activity. According to the reporting, Russian entities procured Western equipment through shell companies and intermediaries outside the EU, including a Cyprus-based front called Mostrello Commercial Limited.
The Dutch items reportedly included specialty maritime gear and services used in survey and support operations for Harmony. At least eight Netherlands-based companies are named in the reporting; some provided vessel services or components used in offshore work, while others supplied equipment later incorporated into the Russian project. The total value of Dutch-linked deliveries identified by the investigators is put at €8 million. Several firms told reporters they comply with EU sanctions and export rules; some said products were delivered to third parties without knowledge of ultimate military use.
“Harmony” itself has been described by investigators as a network of underwater sensors across Russian waters, intended to track and classify submarine movements and other activity on and under the seabed. Le Monde (part of the international reporting consortium) said the project drew on Western components acquired via non-transparent chains and offshore entities. The investigation names Mostrello in Cyprus as a key conduit for purchases benefiting Russian state-linked buyers involved in maritime defence.
Photo Credits: Bent van Aeken/Unsplash
The wider picture
The Dutch government has tightened export controls since 2022, particularly for dual-use goods: civilian items that can also have military applications. But investigators say sanction evasion can occur when goods are shipped to non-EU jurisdictions or masked behind complex ownership and logistics trails. The reporting does not accuse all Dutch suppliers of knowingly supporting military end-use; rather, it highlights the challenge of tracing ultimate end users once equipment leaves the EU.
Under EU rules, directly exporting controlled items to Russia is banned, but gray-zone risks remain when components are widely available, not explicitly controlled, or routed through intermediaries. The seabed is a strategic domain: networks like Harmony could help Russia monitor NATO submarine traffic, protect undersea cables and pipelines, and strengthen maritime situational awareness. That strategic significance is why investigators focused on how Western technology, much of it commercially ordinary, may still boost sensitive defence capabilities when combined in larger systems.
What’s next
Dutch authorities have not publicly detailed specific enforcement steps tied to this case, but the Netherlands and the EU have been expanding “no-Russia” clauses in contracts, end-use checks, and due-diligence expectations for exporters. Companies supplying high-spec maritime or industrial equipment are being urged to vet counterparties more deeply, watch for red-flags like complex routing or opaque buyers, and document end-users. The investigation will likely add pressure on EU governments to close loopholes, scrutinize re-exports from third countries, and increase penalties for sanction evasion.
